In a collectivised pension fund, investors agree that any money remaining in the fund when they die can be shared among the survivors.
Introduction
A group of individuals may group together and invest income for their retirement in a collective fund. When an individual dies, any funds associated with that individual are then divided among the survivors. The paper [2] shows how to model the management of these funds mathematically and argues that they should yield significantly better results for investors than traditional pension investment models. This paper complements [2] by computing the optimal investment strategy for collective investment under the following assumptions:
(i) There are n identical investors in the collective. discrete time. We deduce that we must allow continuous time investment to obtain analytic results.
On the other hand, if we are to allow arbitrary mortality distributions and continuous time consumption, then there is no hope of obtaining analytic results as one wouldn't even be able to write down the mortality distribution in general. Our assumption of discrete time consumption is essentially equivalent to assuming that mortality occurs in discrete time, and so restricts the set of mortality distributions we are considering to ensure tractability.
The advantage of analytic tractability is the insight it gives us into optimal pension investment.
For example, we can analyse how consumption varies over time. We find that except for very special cases, constant consumption is never optimal. This is interesting because many people see a defined-benefit pension which provides constant real-terms income as the "gold standard" for a pension fund. Our result shows that chasing constant income is, in fact, suboptimal.
It perhaps isn't so surprising that if market returns are non-zero there are advantages to taking some risk by investing in equities.
Nor should it be surprising that delaying consumption to benefit from market returns can also be advantageous. We are able to make this precise by computing the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in our model.
It is perhaps, surprising that even if one assumes that both equities and bonds provide no return, it is still not optimal to receive a constant income, if one is satisfaction risk-averse (see below for a definition). Under these circumstances it can be optimal to spend earlier (if the primary risk one perceives is the risk of dying before one can consume one's pension) or to spend later (if the primary risk one perceives is the risk of living for a long time on an inadequate pension).
Let us now describe the structure of the paper. Section 1 reviews the definition of homogeneous Epstein-Zin preferences with mortality.
Section 2 states the optimal investment problems we will solve. The problem depends upon the number of individuals n. We will also state an investment problem for a fund which is intended to represent the limiting case n = ∞.
Section 3 solves the optimal investment problems analytically in the cases where n = 1 and n = ∞.
Section 4 computes how consumption and wealth vary over time, giving analytic descriptions of their probability distributions.
Section 5 generalizes the results to arbitrary fund sizes n. Section 6 uses our results to provide a rigorous justification for the claim that our models for finite n converge to the case n = ∞. This is of obvious theoretical interest in its own right, but we remark that the proof is essential to demonstrating that the strategies for inhomogeneous funds of described in [2] will be effective.
Homogeneous Epstein-Zin utility with mortality
Let us recall the definition of homogeneous Epstein-Zin utility with mortality given in [2] . In order to give a crisp definition, we first define a convention for how we will we handle algebra using infinite and infinitesimal values.
The extended positive reals R ++ is the set
where is a symbol representing an infinitesimal value. We extend addition, multiplication and raising to a real power to R ++ in the obvious way:
We now assume that we are given a time grid T = {t 0 , t 0 + δt, t 0 + 2 δt, t 0 + 3 δt . . . , T − δt} where t 0 is some initial time, δt is a fixed time step and T is the time by which we assume mortality is certain.
We will model the individual's consumption as a non-negative stochastic process (γ t ) t∈T in a filtered probability space (Ω, F, F t , P). The time of death τ is a stopping time taking values in T . Our convention is that any consumption up to and including time τ may effect the individual's utility, but any consumption occurring after time τ will be ignored. Definition 1.2. Homogeneous Epstein-Zin utility with mortality is defined for a non-negative consumption process (γ t ) t∈T and a stopping time τ taking values in T . It depends on parameters α ∈ (−∞, 1) \ {0}, ρ ∈ (−∞, 1) \ {0}, and 0 < β = e −bt ≤ 1. It is the R ++ -valued random process defined recursively by
The optimal investment problem A general optimal investment problem for a homogeneous collective fund was described mathematically in [2] . In this section we summarize the formulation of [2] , specializing to the case of interest for this paper. We model a collective fund of n investors. The fund may invest in either a riskless bond which grows at a risk-free rate of r or in a stock whose price at time t, is denoted S t . The stock price at time t 0 is given. At subsequent times
for a constant drift µ and volatility σ, and a 1-dimensional Brownian motion W t . We will model consumption taking place in discrete time on a grid T as described in the previous section. Since we are modelling consumption in discrete time, we may safely model mortality in discrete time. We let τ be a random variable modelling the time of death of a representative individual. We assume that τ has a probability distribution given by p t dT (t) where dT (t) is the measure given by adding the Dirac measures associated to the grid points of T .
Let s t denote the survival probability between times t and t + δt. That is
Write n t for the number of individuals individuals with a time of death greater than or equal to t. The process (n t ) t∈T is a Markov process, with initial value n t0 . Note, however, that n t+δt will be F t measurable. We choose this convention for n t as it works well with our existing convention that individuals who die at age t still consume at time t.
For the case of a finite number of individuals, the transition probability of n t moving from a value of n at time t to the value i at time t + δt is given by
We also wish to write down a formal optimal investment problem for the case of a fund with n = ∞ investors. In this case we will define n t = ∞ for all times up to T .
We will write a t for proportion of the fund invested in stock at time t. We will write X t for the value of the fund per survivor at time t before consumption. We will define X t = 0 if n t = 0. Similarly, we will write X t for the value of the fund per survivor after consumption. We note that X t = lim h t X h at time points t ∈ T . At intermediate times, t ∈ [iδt, (i + 1)δt), X t obeys the SDE
with initial condition given by the budget equation
unless n t+δt = 0 in which case we define X t to be zero on [t, t + δt). Note that this formula is based on our convention that an individual who dies at a time t still consumes at that time and the corresponding convention for n t which ensures n t+δt is F t measurable.
Let τ i denote the time of death of individual i. For finite n we let (Ω, F, F t , P) be the filtered probability space generated by W t and the time of death variables τ i . We define τ = τ 1 to be the time of death variable for one specific individual whose time of death is greater than or equal to t 0 .
For n = ∞ we let τ be any random variable with the distribution p t dT (t). We let (Ω, F, F t , P) be the filtered probability space generated by W t and τ .
LetÃ(x, t 0 ) denote the space of admissible controls (γ t , a t ): that is F tpredictable processes such that 0 ≤ γ t ≤ X t and with X t0 = x. We define the value function of our problem starting at time t 0 to be v n (x, t 0 ) = sup
where Z t0 is an Epstein-Zin utility function.
3 The cases n = 1 and n = ∞
To highlight the key ideas we will consider only the case when n = 1 and n = ∞ in this section, leaving the case of general n until Section 5. We define C to distinguish these cases as follows
We write z t := v n (1, t) so that the positive-homogeneity of Z t implies that v n (x, t) = x z t .
We note that we have not yet shown whether z is finite, but equation (3.2) can still be interpreted for infinite values of z. Let c t denote the consumption rate at time t, so γ t = c t X t for an individual who is still alive at time t. The budget equation (2.4) can then be written as
We now let A t+δt (x, c t ) be the set of random variables X t+δt representing the value of our investments at time t + δt that can be obtained by a continuous time trading strategy with an initial budget given by (3.3) with X t = x. Thus A t+δt (x, c t ) is the set of admissible investment returns given the budget and the consumption.
The Markovianity of Epstein-Zin preferences and the definition of Z t to compute allow us to apply the dynamic programming principle to compute v n (x, t) = sup
The second line follows from the first by the positive homogeneity of Epstein-Zin utility (3.2). If α > 0, we may compute the value of
by solving the Merton problem for optimal investment over time period [t, t+δt], with initial budget X t , no consumption, and terminal utility function u(x) = x α . We find sup
For details see Merton's paper [6] or [9] equations (3.47) and (3.48) . Moreover the proportion invested in stock is given by a * which is a constant determined entirely by α and the market. In the case where α < 0 we must instead compute
However, apart from the change of a sup to an inf everything is algebraically identical, so the same formulae emerge. Putting the value (3.5) into our expression (3.4) for the value function we obtain
where the last line follows from the budget equation (3.3). We define
so that (3.7) may be written as
Differentiating the expression in square brackets on the right-hand side, we see that the supremum is achieved in equation
or, if this yields a negative value for c * t , we should take c * t = 0. Simplifying we must have
This expression for c * t is non-negative, so it always gives the argument for the supremum in (3.7). We obtain
We conclude that z
where φ is given by equation (3.8) . We observe also that equation (3.11) for the optimal consumption rate per survivor simplifies to
(3.13)
We summarize our findings below. (i) The optimal proportion of stock investments is determined entirely by the monetary-risk-aversion α and the market. In particular it is independent of time and wealth. It is given by the value a * given in equation (3.6).
(ii) The optimal Epstein-Zin utility is given by xz t where z t obeys the difference equation (3.12) . The value of φ t is given in equation (3.8) . The optimal Epstein-Zin utility may be computed recursively since z N δt = 0 1 α .
(iii) The consumption for each survivor at time t is given by γ t = x t c * t where c * t is given by (3.13).
Consumption over time
It is interesting to see how wealth and the consumption per individual vary over time.
Theorem 4.1. Under the same conditions as 3.1, the optimal fund value per survivor at time t, X t , follows a log normal distribution. Write µ X t and σ X t for the mean and standard deviation of log X t so that
The standard deviation is given by
where a * is given by (3.6) . The mean satisfies the difference equation
where z t is given by (3.12) and where we defineξ by the same formula used to define ξ but with α set to zero, i.e.
The optimal consumption per survivor γ t at time t is also log normally distributed with
The mean of the log consumption per survivor satisfies the equation
where φ t is given by equation (3.8).
Proof. We suppose as induction hypothesis that the distribution of X t is as described at time t. The budget equation (3.3) then tells us that the wealth per survivor after consumption, X t , satisfies
. Our investment strategy from t to (t + δt) is a continuous time trading strategy where we hold a fixed proportion of our wealth in stocks at all time. So, in the interval (t, t + δt], X t satisfies the SDE
By Itô's lemma we find
We deduce that (log X t+δt − log X t ) conditioned on the value of X t will follow a normal distribution with meanξ δt and standard deviation a * σ √ δt. Moreover the random variable (log X t+δt − log X t ) is independent of X t .
The sum of independent normally distributed random increments yields a new normally distributed random variable, and one can compute the mean and variance by adding the mean and variance of the increments. Hence
and
(σ X t+δt ) 2 = (σ X t ) 2 + (a * ) 2 σ 2 δt. (4.9)
Solving the recursion (4.9) yields equation (4.2). The result for X t now follows by induction. Equation (4.5) follows from equation (3.13). Using (4.5), (4.3) we calculate
This completes the proof.
To interpret Theorem 4.1 we specialize to the case of a market where µ = r = 0 and to preferences with β = 1. This represents the problem of consuming a fixed lump sum over time when there is no inflation but also no investment opportunities. While not financially reasonable, this problem highlights how longevity risk affects consumption, when considered in isolation from market risk.
In this case γ t is a deterministic function. We find from equations (4.6) and (3.8) that
(4.10)
We note that s t is a non-zero probability, so 0 < s t ≤ 1. We may use equation (4.10) to compute whether γ increases or decreasing over time. We summarize the results in Table 4 .
Perhaps surprisingly, we find that sometimes consumption increases over time rather than decreases. In the collectivised case, this can be explained by the fact that the pension will always be inadequate when α < 0. We say that a pension is inadequate if living an extra year on that pension decreases utility. If α < 0, living longer is considered negative by homogeneous Epstein-Zin preferences, so we may wish to compensate individuals who have the misfortune to live longer. We cannot identify these individuals in advance, so the only way to provide this compensation is to increase consumption over time. Thus the increasing consumption arises from the fact that when α < 0, the primary risk is the inadequacy of the pension, when α > 0, the primary risk is dying young. We believe that this mixing of the notion of pension adequacy with the risk aversion parameter is a significant shortcoming of homogeneous Epstein-Zin preferences. It is the price one must pay for analytic tractability.
In the individual case, the concern that one will die young is much more serious. This is why for the individual problem, the fear of an inadequate pension only dominates when both α < 0 and 0 < ρ < 1.
The case when α = ρ corresponds to the case of standard von-Neumann Morgernstern preferences, in which case constant consumption is optimal in the collectivised case as was proved in [2] .
More significantly, our result also shows the converse. Constant consumption from one period to the next is only optimal if and only if either (i) the survival probability is one, or (ii) α = ρ so one is satisfaction risk-neutral. Hence, even ignoring market effects constant consumption will be suboptimal for any realistic parameter choices.
We have not shown the case α > ρ in Table 4 as in this case one has monetary-risk-aversion but not satisfaction-risk-aversion. We found the resulting behaviour to be difficult to interpret as rational, cautious (as understood intuitively) strategies. We see this simply as a evidence that satisfaction-riskaversion is the correct operationalization of the intuitive notion of risk-aversion.
It is also interesting to calculate how consumption changes according to the available investment opportunities. If interest rates increase one may choose to defer consumption to a later date to benefit from the increased rate. To quantify this behaviour one wishes to calculate the elasticity of intertemporal substitution which is defined as follows. 
Constant Decreasing Table 1 : The behaviour of consumption with time when µ = r = 0, β = 1 and α ≤ ρ.
to be EIS t := 1 δt
When γ t is deterministic, this definition corresponds with the standard definition [5] . For the optimal investment strategy of Theorem (3.1) we have
If µ = r this simplifies to
In the case of von Neumann-Morgernstern utility we have
Proof. From (4.6) and (3.8) we immediately find
The result is now a simple calculation from (3.6) and (4.4).
General finite collectives
Let v n be the value function (2.5) for the optimal investment problem for n individuals with homogeneous Epstein-Zin preferences. By positive homogeneity we may define z n,t := v n (1, t), so that v n (x, t) = xz n,t . Let I i,t0+δt denote the event that both (i) there are i survivors at time t 0 + δt, i.e. n t+δt = i.
(ii) the individual whose utility we wish to calculate is one of those survivors, so τ ι > t.
Recall that X t denotes the value of the fund per survivor at time t before consumption and mortality.
We now let A t+δt (x, c t ) be the set of random variables X t+δt representing the value of the fund per survivor at time t + δt before consumption that can be obtained by a continuous time trading strategy given initial capital X t = n t+δt nt (1 − c t )X t per survivor when X t = x. Writing c t for the rate of consumption and using the dynamic programming principle we find v n (x, t) = sup
We used positive homogeneity to obtain the last line. The argument of Section 3 tells us how to optimize over X t . Hence we find
where ξ is as defined in equation (3.6) . The optimal investment policy is also described in equation (3.6) , and as before it depends only on the market and the monetary-risk-aversion parameter α. We may rewrite our expression for z n,t as follows: 6 Convergence of v n as n → ∞ In this section we will analyse the behaviour as n → ∞ to prove the following. Theorem 6.1. Let z ∞,t denote the maximum Epstein-Zin utility at time t for the infinitely collectivized case then z n,t = z ∞,t + O(n − 1 2 ).
Our proof strategy will be to approximate an expectation involving the binomial distribution with a Gaussian integral which we can then estimate using Laplace's method. To get a precise convergence result, we need some estimates on the rate of convergence in the Central Limit Theorem. The estimates given in [4] suit our purposes well. For the reader's convenience we will summarize the result we will need.
We begin with some definitions. A random variable X is said to satisfy Cramér's condition if its characteristic function f X satisfies sup{|f X (t)| | t > η} < 1 (6.1) for all positive η. Let Φ be the standard normal distribution. Given a set A ⊆ R, and a function g, ω g (A) is defined to equal
The set B (x) is the ball of radius around x. Let Q n be the appropriately normalized n-th partial sum of a sequence of independent identically distributed random variables X (i) for which Cramér's condition holds and which have finite moments have all orders. Appropriately normalized means normalized such that the central limit theorem implies Q n converges to Φ in distribution. Then there exists a constant c such that for any bounded measurable function g
The full result given in [4] is more general and more precise than we need. Let us explain how the statements are related. We have simplified our statement to the one-dimensional case, we have assumed the X (i) are identically distributed and we have assumed all moments of X (1) exist. The statement in [4] is therefore more complex, and in particular involves additional terms called ρ s,n defined in the one-dimensional case by
Var(X (i) ) −1
.
Our assumptions on X guarantee that ρ s,n is independent of n and so we have been able to absorb these terms into the constant c. In addition, our statement uses Theorem 1 of [4] , together with remarks at the end of the second paragraph on page 242 about Cramér's condition.
We are now ready to prove the desired convergence result.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. We proceed by a backward induction on t. The result is trivial for the case t = T . We now assume the induction hypothesis z n,t+δt = z ∞,t+δt + O(n − 1 2 ).
We wish to computeθ n,t , but only the sum in the expression (5.3) is difficult to compute. We will call this sum λ n,t , so
Heuristically, one can approximate with a Gaussian integral using the Central Limit Theorem and then apply Laplace's method to compute the limit as n → ∞. This motivates the idea of decomposing the sum above into a "left tail" for small values of i, a central term for values of i near the mean of the Binomial distribution np, and a "right tail" for larger values of i. We will in fact bound the tails separately (Steps 1 and 2, below), and then we will be able to rigorously apply a Central Limit Theorem argument to the central term (Step 3).
We compute
. (6.4) We note that
So we define an integer N λ,t,n by N λ,t,n := (n + 1)(1 − s t ) (λ − 1)s t + 1
and then equation (6.4) will ensure that we have exponential decay of S t (i, n) as i decreases i ≤ N λ,t,n =⇒ S(n, i) ≤ λ i−N λ,t,n S(n, N λ,t,n ). (6.5)
Step 1. We can now estimate the left tail of (6.3). There exists a constants C 1,t , C 2,t such that
To estimate this term, we observe that
Hence by equations (6.4) and (6.6) we find
which decays exponentially as n → ∞. Our induction hypothesis ensures that the z α i,t+δt are bounded, so we may safely conclude that λ n,t :=   n i=N3,t,n i n
Step 2. We apply the same strategy to the right tail. This time we compute
Repeating the same argument as for the left tail tells us that
We note that i n 1−α is monotonic in i and that N3,t,n n and N3,t,n n tend to finite, non-zero limits as n → ∞. We deduce that there exists a constant C 3,t such that
This implies that M3,t,n i=N3,t,n i n
Using this together with our induction hypothesis, we may obtain from (6.8) that
Step 3. In order to apply the bound (6.2), we define a Bernoulli random variable X i,t which takes the value 1 if the i-th individual survives at time t and 0 otherwise. Thus S t (n, i) is the probability that n j=1 X j,n = i. We define scaled random variablesX j,t of mean 0 and standard deviation 1 bỹ
and so the appropriately scaled partial sum Q n is given by
We now wish to rewrite (6.10) as an integral.
We make the substitution i = ns t + x ns t (1 − s t ) to find λ n,t = 1 [N3,t,n,M3,t,n] (ns t + x ns t (1 − s t ))
We may rewrite this as From our expressions for N 3,t,n and M 3,t,n one readily sees that n,t tends to −∞ at a rate proportional to O(− √ n) as n → ∞. Likewise u n,t tends to +∞ at a rate O( √ n) as n → ∞. We will assume that n is large enough to ensure that n,t < 0 < u n,t .
Let us define g by
(6.13) By (6.9), g is bounded by a constant independent of n. Hence ω g (R) is bounded independent of n. We can bound the derivative of g inside the interval ( n,t , u n,t ), independent of n. Hence for any x ∈ ( 1 2 n,t , 1 2 u n,t ) and for sufficiently large n, ω g (B cn − 1 2 (x)) < C 4,t n − 1 2 for some constant C 4,t independent of n. It follows that
Since n,t tends to −∞ at a rate proportional to O(− √ n), since g is bounded, and since the normal distribution has super-exponential decay in the tails, we have 1 (−∞, n,t ] ω g (B Estimates (6.14), (6.15), (6.16) together with the bound on ω g (R) allow us to apply the Central Limit Theorem estimate (6.2) to (6.12). We note that Cramér's condition holds. The result is
We now apply Laplace's method to estimate this Gaussian integral (see Proposition 2.1, page 323 in [10] ) and obtain
From the definition ofθ in equation (5.3) and our definition of λ n,t in (6.3) we obtainθ
. We may now compare this with the definition of θ t given in (3.8) for the infinitely collectivised case C = 1. We see that in this casẽ
It now follows from the recursion relations for z n,t and z ∞,t (given in (3.12) and (5.4) respectively) together with our induction hypothesis that
This completes the induction step and the proof.
Numerical Results
We illustrate our results with some numerical examples. We will restrict our attention to the case of von Neumann-Morgernstern preferences in this section. We refer the reader to the numerical results of [2] where we give numerical results for more general homogeneous Epstein-Zin preferences. In that paper we also compare the results with those obtained using exponential Kihlstrom-Mirman preferences.
For ease of comparison with [2] (and other pension models based on [8] ) we choose the parameter values given in Table 2 . Due to the positive homogeneity of our model, the choice of value for X 0 is unimportant.
The mortality distribution we use is for women retiring at age 65 in 2019. We obtained this distribution using the model "CMI 2018 F [1.5%]" as described in [7] .
We define the annuity equivalent value of each investment-consumption approach. We define this to be the price of an annuity which would give the same gain. We define the annuity outperformance by annuity outperformance := annuity equivalent budget − 1.
This gives a measure of the performance of the strategy relative to an annuity of the same cost. 
Dependence on the number of individuals, n
In Figure 1 we show how the annuity outperformance depends upon the number of individuals n in the collective. This plot shows that as few as 40 individuals are required to obtain most of the benefits of collectivisation. One does not need a large fund to benefit from a collective investment: simply sharing risk with one's partner brings a substantial benefit. n $QQXLW\RXWSHUIRUPDQFH ,QGLYLGXDO &RXSOH )LQLWHn Q Figure 1 : Dependence of annuity outperformance on the number of individuals in the collective, n. Calculation performed with von Neumann-Morgernstern preferences
Dependence on market parameters
To compare the relative impact of investment in the stock market, inter-temporal substitution and collectivisation we have computed the annuity outperformance for a number of different fund and market scenarios. The results are shown in Scenario µ r n Annuity outperformance 1 0.062 0.027 ∞ 59.1% 2 0.062 0.027 1 20.5% 3 0.027 0.027 ∞ 1.3% 4 0.000 0.000 ∞ 0% Table 3 : Annuity outperformance in a variety of scenarios Table 3 . Except where the table indicates a difference, the parameter values are described in the previous section. If scenarios A and B have an annuity outperformance of r A and r B then we will say that scenario A gives an improvement of
over scenario B. So comparing Scenario 1 with Scenario 2 we see that the impact of collectivisation in this example is an improvement of 32%. Comparing Scenarios 1 and 3, the impact of investing in stock, rather than just bonds, is even more significant, yielding an almost 57% improvement. Comparing Scenarios 3 and 4, we see that exploiting inter-temporal substitution alone yields a relatively modest 1.3% improvement.
